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ing section of our own Code relative to service on carriers :32
"In a case against any common carrier (other than a
corporation) for any liability as such, it shall be sufficient
to serve any process against or notice to the carrier, or
any agent, or the driver, captain or conductor of any vehicle of such carrier, and to publish a copy of the process
or notice as an order is published under the twelfth section of this chapter."
It is not likely that this form of service has been commonly
resorted to, and the absence of annotation indicates that the
question of constitutionality of the act has never been
raised. Might it not be upheld on the basis of reasonable
regulation? If the operating of the vehicles of the common carrier endangers public safety, then under the police
power it can be regulated, and the state can provide that
the doing of such acts shall subject it to the jurisdiction of
the courts as to causes of action arising out of such acts.
There would be a question, of course, as to whether such
regulation was reasonable and whether the notice provided
was sufficient. The operating of numerous auto bus lines
into the state might make it desirable to resort to the form
of service on nonresident common carriers, not incorporated, provided by this section, which might be upheld as
a reasonable exercise of the police power.
-EDIMUND

C. DICKINSON.

BARNES' W. VA. CODE ANN. 1923, c. 124 §9.

THE CHANGING LAW OF COMPETITION-REHABILITATION
AFTER IMPEACHMENT BY CONTRADICTION.-When a witness

has been impeached by testimonial contradiction, the courts
do not always permit him to be rehabilitated by disproving
the alleged error. But when, as in the principal case, one
has been impeached by "editorial" contradiction, all the
authorities, including editorial writers, are unanimous in favoring not only a right of rehabilitation but a "no right" of
re-contradiction and a right of trial by battle in case of any
attempt. Accordingly it is herein proposed to rehabilitate
the policy against ruinous competition which was advocated by the writer in the last issue of this Quarterly' and
; Thomas P. Hardman, "The Changing Law
Another Word," 34 W. VA. L. QuAR. 123 (1928).
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which was, to many, convincingly
impeached by Mr. Arnold
'2
in his able editorial "Dissent."
The essence of Mr. Arnold's argument is that this policy
is judicial legislation and that courts should judicially legislate
only "when there is no substantial difference of opinion as to
the social desirabilityof the change." Thus, Mr. Arnold agrees
with the writer that "within appropriate limits judicial
legislation is justifiable." But he denies that appropriate
limits include the promulgation of a policy against ruinous
competition in public service, for the reason that here reasonable men differ as to the necessity for a new policy.
This means that, though there is actually the social desirability of the change, we can not judicially have what is
socially desirable in case some reasonable men think a
change undesirable.
If that were a correct criterion for changing the law
judicially, our common law today would be much the same as
it was in ancient times, at any rate so far as conscious growth
is concerned, for perhaps most of the important conscious
judicial changes in the law have been made over the opposition of reasonable men. Certainly judges in general must
be classed as reasonable men. But many of the now admittedly justifiable changes in the law have been judicially
promulgated over the well-meant dissent of four of the nine
judges, or two of the five, or some such substantial proportion of the judges. It seems certain therefore that, if we
take the law as we find it in the twentieth century, it can
not be laid down as a general proposition that, when the
courts do change the law, they change it only when there is
no substantial difference of opinion as to the social desirability of the change.
The well-known recent change in our law, whereby liability was imposed upon the owner of a "family" automobile for the negligent operation thereof by a member of the
family, will suffice as an illustration. This sheer judicial
legislation, changing the time-honored qui facit per alium
facit per se into the now famous "qui facit per auto facit per
se," was made over the very able dissent of perhaps the noblest
Roman of them all. And many others, mostly reasonable,
2 The Changing Law of Competition in Public Service-A Dissent, ibid. 183.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol34/iss3/7

2

Hardman: The Changing Law of Competition--Rehabilitation After Impeachment
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
extra-judicially dissented. But the result is admittedly salutary.
Of course the courts should not be hasty in changing
ihe law; for, among other reasons, the social interest in stability must be adequately secured-therefore, stare decisis as
a rule. But the equally important social interest in progress must also be properly protected; and progress will be
unduly impeded and often completely prevented if we must
always wait for a judicial change until there is no substantial difference of opinion as to the social desirability of
the change. Let us therefore have judges who, though not
hasty leaders of a minority, will cautiously progress with a
preponderant majority, when progress is socially desirable,
even though, as is commonly the case, there is a substantial
minority of reasonable men who think it socially desirable
that our law, like the law of the Medes and Persians,
should change not.
-T. P. HARDMAN.
As to when such progress is socially desirable and therefore Justifiable. ce

my

paper, "Stare Decisis and the Modern Trend," 32 W. VA. L. QUAR. 163 (1926).

SUFFICIENCY OF A NEW PROMISE TO TAKE AN ACCOUNT OUT
OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-In West Virginia, an ac-

tion upon an account is barred by the statute of limitations
after five years from the date at which "the right to bring
same shall have accrued";1 but it is further provided, in
the chapter dealing with the limitation of suits that:
"If any person against whom the right shall have so
accrued on an award, or on any other contract, shall by
writing signed by him or his agent promise payment of
money on such award or contract, the person to whom
the right shall have so accrued, may maintain an action
or suit for the moneys so promised, within such number
of years after the said promise, as it might originally
have been maintained within, upon the award or contract, and the plaintiff may either sue on such a promise,
or on the original cause of action, and in the latter case,
in answer, to a plea under the sixth section, may, by way
1 WEST

VlIGINIA CODE,

c. 104, § 6.
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